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A core element of Europe 
EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT A high-level Government Commission in Germany recently concluded that 
employee rights have developed in line with national traditions and are part of Europe's basic demo-
cratic fabric. For the present, the transparent attempt by employers in Germany to use Europe against 
board-level representation has failed. 
By KURT BIEDENKOPF, WOLFGANG STREECK and HELLMUT WISSMANN . Kurt Biedenkopf is former President of Saxony; Wolfgang Streeck is Director of the 
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies and Hellmut Wissmann is the former President of the Federal Labour Court. The authors were the academic 
members of the Government Commission on the modernisation of employee board level representation. The text is a slightly shortened version of the chapter 
which compares employee board-level representation in Germany with the situation elsewhere in Europe, presented as part of the final report in December 2006. 
The German system of b. oard- level representa-tion is one of a variery of forms of employee involvement in company decision-making processes across Europe. The arrangements 
which exist in this area in different countries have grown 
up over a long period of time and, in their basic elements, 
have shown themselves to be resistant to all attempts at 
harmonisation. In countries like the UK and Italy, whose 
industrial relations have traditionally been characterised 
by conflict, there are no legal provisions for the involve-
ment of employees at company level; here the unions pre-
fer to rely entirely on collective agreements, over which 
they can take strike action, in representing their members. · 
In Germany, on the other hand, the economic and social 
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order that developed after the Second World War includes a system of employee 
representation on supervisory boards, giving them half the seats in companies 
with more than 2,000 employees . 
IN A EUROPEAN CONTEXT_ Jn li ght of the wide-ranging opportunities for 
influence available to employee representatives on single-tier boards, as in the 
Scandinavian countries for example, it remains an open question whether and 
to what extent German arrangements represent a particularly far-reaching 
form of employee involvement at board level. It is, however, undisputed that 
the parity of membership of supervisory boards in large companies (where 
employee and shareholder representatives have an equal number of seats) 
exists in name only, given that a second vote can be cast by the chair (who 
always represents the shareholders). It also cannot be disputed that the 
arrangements for employee representatives to have a third of the seats .... 

MICHAEL SOMMER, 
President of the 0GB, 
the German trade union 
confederation : 
"From a trade union per-
spective, we welcome the in-
volvement of the viewpoints 
and positions of foreign 
workforces in the supervisory 
board . However, we need to 
take care that making super-
visory boards more interna-
tional does not lead to the 
exclusion of external union 
representatives . This is be-
cause the results of current 
studies show that it is pre-
cisely the representatives of 
the unions who bring politi -
cal and legal knowledge into 
the work of supervisory 
boards and have an impor-
tant coordinating role for 
employee members. In a 
more international supervisory 
board this role could grow in 
importance. That is why the 
DGB proposes as a first 
uncontroversial step, that the 
law should allow employees 
outside Germany to stand as 
candidates". 
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COMMISSION REPORT 
Backing for board-level representation 
The Commission on the modernisation of employee board-level representation in Germany 
presented its report to the German Chancellor Angela Merkel on 20 December last year. 
In the report, the academic members of the 
Commission, all acknowledged experts in board-
level representation, come to the conclusion 
that the core of the system has proved its worth 
and they "see no reason to propose a funda-
mental revision of German board-level repre-
sentation to the Federal Government". Instead 
they recommend it should be carefully further 
developed and adapted to the changed eco-
nomic and social circumstances. However, it did 
not prove possible to gain the support of both 
HANDING OVER THE COMMISSION REPORT TO 
CHANCELLOR MERKEL: The academic members 
Wissmann, Biedenkopf and Streeck (left to right) 
"see no reason to propose a fundamental revision 
of German board-level representation" . 
the employers and the unions for a common 
position . The unions were undoubtedly critical 
of some of the recommendations, but the em-
ployers rejected the report in its entirety because 
it did not meet their demands for a reduction in 
board-level representation rights. 
The remit of the Government Commission 
- which was put in place by the then Chancellor 
Gerhard Schroder in March 2005 - was "to 
make proposals for a further development in the 
level, which is modern and appropriate to Euro-
pean circumstances, taking current legislation as 
its starting point." 
The members of the nine-strong Commission 
were: The academic members: Kurt Biedenkopf, 
former President of Saxony and the Commission 
Chair (after whom the Commission is sometimes 
known), Wolfgang Streeck, Director of the Max 
Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, and 
Hellmut Wissmann, a former president of the 
Federal Labour Court. 
The employer representatives: Manfred 
Gentz, a former board member of DaimlerChrys-
ler and head of the ICC-International Chamber 
of Commerce in Germany, Dieter Hundt, Presi-
dent of the Confederation of German Employers' 
Associations - BOA, and Jurgen Thumann, Presi-
dent of the Federation of German Industry -
801. 
The union representatives: Jurgen Peters, 
President of IG Metall - the metalworking un-
ion , Gunter Reppien, Chair of the company 
works council at RWE Power AG, and Michael 
Sommer, President of the 0GB, the Confedera-
tion of German Trade Unions. 
In its deliberations the Commission was able 
to draw on the expertise of three research insti -
tutes: the Hans Beckler Foundation in Dussel-
dorf, the Cologne Institute for Economic Re-
search (IW) and the Max Planck Institute for the 
Study of Societies, also based in Cologne. 
It is still unclear whether and in what form the 
Commission's results will be taken up by the gov-
ernment or the parliament. If this happens, the 
0GB has·expressed its willingness to cooperate. 
Chancellor Merkel has also declared her support 
in principle for employee board-level representa-
tion, and emphasised that "board-level represen-
tation is part of our social market economy, whose 
absence would be unthinkable and which has 
system of employee representation at board proved itself in Germany." • 
1J,, - the legal requirement in German companies with between 500 
and 2,000 employees - i not unusual in a European context. It can 
be found in Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Lux-
embourg and the Netherlands. In addition it is not enough to de-
scribe the existing forms of employee board-level involvement 
solely in terms of the legally required percentage of seats: 
• In a range of countries, particularly in Scandinavia, the law pro-
vide for an absolute number of employee representatives, rather 
than a percentage. This can lead to employee representation being 
above a third of the seats. 
• In Scandinavia in particular, the right to employee board-level 
representation is essentially a trade union right. As a resu lt, the 
unions, which also undertake collective bargaining, have direct ac-
cess to company decision-making processes. In Germany, on the 
other hand, it is the workforce that has a right to employee board-
level representation and legislation narrowly limits the role and 
influence of the unions. 
• Ar the same time, unions in Germany are tied into economic re-
sponsibility for companies with employee board-level representa-
tion, as the legislation reserves a number of supervisory board seats 
for union nominated individuals. Unions in Latin and the Anglo-
Saxon countries, with a more confrontationa l approach, expressly 
reject this form of involvement as a hindrance to the independent 
representation of their members' interests. 
• The thresholds from which rights to board-level representation 
apply are very much lower in many European states than in Ger-
many. In Sweden, employee board-level representation begins in 
companies with 25 employees, in Denmark with 35, in the Czech 
Republic with 50, in Finland with 150 and in Hungary with 200. In 
Austria employees can send representatives to the supervisory board 
as soon as there is a works council, and it can be elected when there 
are just five employees. Overall there is a link between minimum size 
and the proportion of employee seats; in general, if the proportion 
of seats is low then the minimum number of employees required for 
board-level representat ion will also be relatively low. 
Taking all of these issues into account, the outstanding features 
of the German system of board-level representation are the numeri-
cally equal number of seats in companies with more than 2,000 
employees and the very high thresholds - not the fact of employee 
involvement in itself. This has been confirmed by recent develop-
ment in other European countries, as well as in European Com-
munity law. It is noteworthy, for example, that countries like the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia also introduced 
wide-ranging employee rights to board-level representation in the 
1990s. From this perspective, it cannot be claimed that employee 
board-level representation in Germany is a unique phenomenon. 
In any case any form of employee representation at board level 
can only be evaluated within the context of industrial relations in 
society as a whole. It is noticeable that where there is board-level 
representation, there are frequently also various forms of involve-
ment in plant-level decision making and rights which result from 
HUBERTUS SCHMOLDT, 
President of IGBCE, 
the mining, chemicals 
and energy union: 
"If employee board-level 
representation is to be fur-
ther developed, this means 
making it European and in-
ternational. We can clearly 
see that companies have be-
come more international, 
and, of course, we need to 
take account of this in our 
own deliberations. Until now 
employees outside Germany 
have not been involved at 
supervisory board level. The 
IGBCE believes the employee 
representatives on the super-
visory board should reflect a 
company's international em-
ployees ." 
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free collective bargaining, which em-
ployees can use alongside their board-
level rights. These are complementary 
systems for collectively reconciling 
different interests, which are organ-
ised differently in different countries, 
and the importance of each element 
often varies from collntry to country. 
So, a level of instituriona I employee 
involvement at workplace and com-
pany level, which is weaker than that 
in Germany, may be compensated for 
by possibilities of influence through 
collective union bargaining which 
exceed those in Germany. Looking at 
board- level representation in isola-
tion, therefore, only provides a limited 
indication of the extent and intensity 
of employee influence on company 
decisions. 
IN LINE WITH GERMAN PRACTICE 
European Union legi lation has ac-
cepted the German dual system of 
plant-level and board-level representa-
tion as fit for purpose. This is shown 
in the European Company (SE), where 
the structure consists of an SE works 
council on the one hand and employee 
representation in the managing or ad-
ministrative body of the company on 
the other. ln this sense European legal 
developments have been in line with 
German practice. This is a lso reflected 
in the fact that Community law has 
given company board-level representa-
tion rights to the workforce and not 
to the unions. At the same time Euro-
pean legislation has respected the di-
versity of the national traditions that 
exist in the area of employee board-
level representation. So, steps have 
been taken to prevent companies using 
the move to a European legal form to 
escape from their national obligations 
relating to employee involvement in 
company decisions. 
It is true that European law, while 
in principle recognising the right of 
employees to be involved in company 
decisions, has refrained from ere- IJ,, 
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TRIED AND TESTED 
Law on the involvement of employees at board level: in effect since 1 July 1976 
•1 Shareholder representatives 
• ., 
•1 Employee representatives from the workforce 
.•: 
·~· . , 




•1 Seats nominated by the unions 
Chair - has a second 
• vote if the vote is tied 
.. 
• 
Covers around 730 companies with 2,000 employees 
or more 
Size of the supervisory board - 12 to 20 members, 
depending on the number of employees 
Same number of seats for the employees (including the 
senior manager) as for the shareholders; shareholders have 
an advantage because the chair of the supervisory board 
has a second vote 
Trade unions can nominate two seats (three in 20-strong 
supervisory boards); their candidates have to stand for 
election like the representatives from the workforce 
Direct election - from 8,000 employees, indirect election 
through delegates 
Senior manager 
BIEDENKOPF COMMISSION PROPOSALS 
Companies should be able to adapt the model of employee in-
volvement they use, provided the two sides - the management 
board and an employee body - wish to do so. It should be pos-
sible to negotiate: 
the degree of employee involvement in companies that are 
tightly controlled by the group parent company, through ei-
ther an increase (up from one third to 50 per cent) or a de-
crease (down from 50 per cent to one third) in the number of 
employee seats on supervisory boards; 
• the size of the supervisory board - it should be possible for 
it to be both larger and smaller; 
the mechanism for including employees from outside Ger-
many on the supervisory board and in the elections to the 
supervisory board. 
The negotiating body for the employees should be made up 
of representatives of the works council, the union and senior 
managers, in line with the number of seats they have in the 
supervisory board . In principle, decisions should be taken on 
the basis of a three-quarters majority. 
.,. ating a single unified model of employee representation at 
board level. In essence European legislat ion has limited 
itself to building bridges between the diversity of nation-
al arrangements so as to a llow cross-border cooperation 
while maintaining the independence of national legal and 
social structures. It has done this, above all , by giving 
European Companies space to shape board-level repre-
sentation in line with their individual circumstances - to 
a large extent the legislation is permissive. Community 
law also provides for the involvement of workforces from sites in different 
member states in employee representation at board level - omething which 
so far has not been possible in national regulations. 
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THE INTERFACE WITH COMPANY LAW_ As far as the details of the development 
of European company law are concerned, the diversity of existing forms and 
traditions of employee involvement in Europe had for decades frustrated all 
attempts to introduce the European Company (SE) through EU legislation. 
The original intention to equip the SE with a single unified set of board-level 
JURGEN PETERS, 
President of IG Metall, 
the metalworkers union: 
"We explicitly welcome the 
fact that German board-level 
representation has been 
placed in a European con-
text. This is particularly in 
view of the fact that the in-
volvement of employees and 
unions will become increas-
ingly important in shaping 
social Europe in the future." 
representation rights could not be realised. As a result a new solu-
tion for employee involvement in the SE was chosen in European 
legislation - one that was fundamentally different from the existing 
statutory models in individual member states. 
In this arrangement, unlike in the German system, there is no 
pre-determined employee involvement depending on the objective 
characteristics of the company such as the number of employee . 
Instead, in the first instance, employee representation at board 
level is to be agreed through open negotiations between company 
management and a special negotiating body of the employees. If 
negotiations fail, statutory fa llback regulations apply, which, as well 
as information and consultation rights, also contain a right for em-
ployees to be represented at board level. 
In this, Community legislation provides for a "before and after 
approach" . In order broadly to secure the existing extent of em-
ployee involvement rights, board-level representation in the SE is 
based on the situation that applied in this regard in the fo unding 
companies. Employee involvement is dealt with in the same way in 
the newly created legal form for the European Cooperative Society 
(SCE) . Similarly, in European legislation on cross-border company 
mergers, the SE model for employee involvement has been used with 
slight changes for the companies which emerge from the fusion of 
firms wi th differing national identities. 
A GROWING PROBLEM OF LEGITIMACY_ Under German law on 
board-level representation, both the right to vote and the right to 
stand for the workforce seats on the supervisory board is limited to 
employees in sites of the company or its subsidiaries located in 
Germany. However, most of the companies affected, either directly 
or through their subsidiaries, have foreign sites. Their workforces 
are as affected by the supervisory board's decisions as the employees 
in Germany. However, the employee representa ti ves in supervisory 
boards have no mandate from the employees outside Germany. In 
this respect, German legislation o n board-level representation does 
not differ from regulations on employee involvement in other coun-
tries. Only European legislation provides for cross-border employee 
repre entation, a nd then only for the bodies covered by its own 
legislation - SEs, European Cooperative Societies and companies 
resu lting from cross-border mergers. The problem of legitimacy 
grows in significance as companies and groups based in Germany 
become increasingly internationalised and, as a result, include more 
and more employees outside Germany, who make the demand to 
influence decisions that affect them. 
These problems can only be comprehensively resolved by provid-
ing a procedure for the appointment of employee members of the 
supervisory board which includes all the sites of a company or a 
group irrespective of whether they are inside or outside Germany. 
This req uires regulations that are binding in all the states affected. 
As national law ca nnot have this effect on a foreign territory, on ly 
European Community law is relevant, a t least for the EU area . 
However, there are no signs that a harmonisation of employee rep-
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resentation at board-level can be ex-
pected in the foreseeab le future. As 
long as this is the case, then at least 
measures should be taken by German 
legislators, which, while not remov-
ing the legitimacy proble.m, could 
reduce it severity. It is therefore rec-
ommended that there should be a 
legal option allowing for agreements, 
on the basis of which the employees 
outside Germany of companies and 
subsidiaries of groups with board-
level involvement cou ld be included 
in representation on the supervisory 
boa~. • 
---- FURTHER INFORMATION 
!c:5J! A summary and assessment of 
the results of the Government 
Commission on the modernisa-
tion of employee board-level 
representation in Germany by 
the Hans Biickler Foundation is 
available in German, English, 
French and Italian. Download 
it from 
www.boeckler-boxen.de 
under the heading "Mitbestim-
mung in Deutsch land". 
The full final report of the aca-
demic members of Government 
Commission (also known as 
the Biedenkopf Commission), 
together with the positions of 
both the employee and em-
ployer members, is avai lable as 
a PDF in German on this web-
site, too. 
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